Relationship banking based on Okun's "customer credit markets" has important implications for monetary policy via the credit transmission channel. Studies of LDC credit markets from this point of view seem to be scanty and this paper attempts to address this lacuna. Relationship banking implies short-term disequilibrium in credit markets, suggesting the VECM (vector error-correction model) as an appropriate framework for analysis. We develop VECM models in the Indian context (for the period April 1991-December 2004 using monthly data) to analyse salient features of the credit market. An analysis of the ECMs (error-correction mechanisms) reveals that disequilibrium in the Indian credit market is adjusted via demand responses rather than supply responses, which is in accordance with the customer view of credit markets. Further light on the working of the model is obtained through the "generalized" impulse responses and "generalized" error decompositions (both of which are independent of the variable ordering). Our conclusions point towards firms using short-term credit as a liquidity buffer. This fact, together with the gradual adjustment exhibited by the "persistence profiles" provides substantive evidence in favour of "customer credit markets".
INTRODUCTION
The demand for credit is assumed to depend on real activity as well as the cost of credit. As an indicator of real activity, we employ the index of industrial production (IIP), which is the only indicator of real activity available at monthly frequency. It is admittedly an unsatisfactory measure, since it excludes services (which are an increasingly important component of GDP). Quarterly series of GDP is available, but only for a brief recent period (post-1996) . The cost of credit to the borrower is represented by the prime lending rate (PLR) of the State Bank of India, which is the largest commercial bank in the country, and whose PLR is regarded as a reference rate by the rest of the Indian banking system.
The supply of credit (NFBC) depends both on the return on credit and its availability.
The net return on credit from the bank's point of view is the spread between the lending rate (proxied by the PLR) and the cost of funding. The latter would be related to a short-term interest rate. In the Indian context two choices are available -the interbank call money rate (CMR) and the rate on 91-day treasury bills (TBR). Both are closely watched by the monetary authorities, the CMR in this regard closely paralleling the Federal Funds rate in the U.S. The TBR is however more directly related to the long-term rate of interest, via the fortnightly auction system of treasury bills and dated government securities in operation by the monetary authority (Reserve Bank of India). We experiment with both choices of the short-term rate of interest in our empirical exercise. The theoretical justification for a credit availability variable comes from Jaffee & Stiglitz (1990) who building on Keynes' (1930) concept of a "fringe of unsatisfied borrowers" conclude that in models allowing for credit monthly data is recorded for non-food credit as an aggregate with no break-up into priority and nonpriority credit.
rationing, credit availability may be more important than the cost of credit. Since models of customer credit markets do allow for the possibility of credit rationing, an availability variable is indicated. In the Indian context, the broad money measure M3 seems the most appropriate candidate -statistics on broader liquidity measures are not forthcoming on a reliable or regular basis.
Thus we estimate two VECM models, which differ only in the choice of the shortterm interest rate 
ESTIMATION RESULTS
The first step in the estimation of the VECM is to check for the stationarity properties of the variables under investigation. This was done via the standard ADF statistics (with the lags being based on the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion)). The results are presented in Table 1 . All the variables show strong evidence supportive of unit roots 6 , and hence a VECM model is in order.
We next turn our attention to the selection of the orders of the VAR models. A maximum order of 6 was specified and the AIC and SBC (Schwarz-Bayesian 6 There is some equivocation in the case of the CMR and PLR -the ADF regressions including a trend throw up statistics which are insignificant and marginally significant respectively. However, the trend term itself was insignificant in both these cases, and in the models without trend, the ADF statistics are significant as It is now possible to estimate the member of co-integrating relations in our models. It is usual to distinguish the following 5 cases, depending on the cointegration VAR specification. Table 2 and 3 respectively, and for both models, the 2 tests unanimously suggest the number of cointegrating vectors r as r = 3.
7 Thus capitalization of banks seems to have impacted on credit availability at least a year ahead of the actual implementation.
The unrestricted cointegrating vectors are displayed in Table 4 . A priori one expects credit demand (NFBC) to be negatively related to the PLR and positively related to the index of industrial production IIP, while credit supply is expected to be positively related to the return on credit (PLR) and negatively related to its cost (CMR or TBR), and perhaps additionally also positively related to credit availability (as proxied by money supply M3) Thus cointegrating vector 2 and 3 (for both models) are potential credit demand and credit supply equations. The interpretation of cointegrating vector 1 is unclear at the moment. It could either be a money demand function or a money supply reaction function of the monetary authorities, which can only be decided after further analysis.
We now impose restrictions on the cointegrating vectors for identifying the system.
Since the number of cointegrating vectors is r = 3, we need to impose three restrictions on each vector for exact identification (see Johansen (1988 Johansen ( , 1991 ). We impose the following exact restrictions (for both models)
Where CI (J) refers to the coefficient of the Jth variable in the Ith cointegrating vector (The ordering of the variables is as per Table 4) The rationale for the imposed restrictions is as follows . Apart from the above exact identification restrictions, we also impose an additional restriction to test whether the availability variable M3 affects credit supply. Thus we impose the over-identification restriction.
C3 (5) = 0
The testing of such over-identifying restrictions is discussed in Pesaran (!997) and Pesaran & Shin (1996) .
The estimated cointegrating vectors under the above restrictions together with the likelihood ratio (LR) statistics for the over-identifying restriction is presented in Table 6 While both Models A and B throw up similar conclusions, the latter specification seems slightly superior in view of the TBR being a more reliable indicator of the cost of short-term funds to banks than CMR. Hence in the following sections, our interpretations will be primarily focused on Model B, with a view to rendering the discussion more compact. Where it is deemed relevant, the results from Model A will be presented alongside too.
LONG-RUN STRUCTURAL MODELLING
In Table 7 , we take a look at the factor loadings for Model B; these loadings indicate the speed of convergence of each variable towards the long-run equilibrium (ie. These generalized impulse responses are the difference between the expectation of a future value of the variable conditioned on the shock and the history of the system and its expectation conditioned on its history alone 10 . This, of course, requires some assumption about the distribution of the shocks, which is generally taken to be multivariate Gaussian. We present the generalized impulse responses of all the variables in the system to shocks in the credit variable (NFBC) in Fig. 1 , whereas, The positive ( and significant) factor loadings obtained for IIP and PLR in Table 7 , are correct since IIP and PLR enter with negative signs in cointegrating vectors 2 and 3 respectively 10 Thus, if y t+n is the future value of the variable at time (t+n), v t the current shock and w t-1 the history of the system, the generalised impulse responses is given by Tables 8 and 9 ). Table 8 
CONCLUSIONS
Systematic studies of the credit market in India have been lacking and the present paper tries to address this lacuna. We build a model of the Indian credit market, focussing on non-food bank credit (NFBC) in the post-1991 (liberalisation period).
The theoretical basis for the model is the "customer" view of credit markets introduced by Okun (1981) (also termed as "relationship banking" in the later literature). Such a view also has important implications for the "credit channel"
version of monetary policy.
Disequilibrium in the credit market emerges as a distinct possibility in models of this genre, and hence an appropriate methodology for modelling in this context, becomes the VECM. We build two version of a VECM for the Indian credit market -Model A based on the call money rate as an index of the cost of funds to the banking system and Model B using the 91-day Treasury Bill rate as a proxy for this cost. Both models throw up three cointegrating relations which sustain the interpretations of a money demand, a credit demand and a credit-supply equation respectively. Identifying restrictions were imposed on each model, to test various restrictions suggested by the theory, and were found congruent to the data. However, on diagnostic counts, Model B emerged somewhat superior, and further analysis was focussed on this version only.
An analysis of the ECMs (error correction mechanisms) revealed that disequilibrium in the credit market is rectified via demand rather than supply factors, which is consistent with the customer view of credit markets. Further insights into the working of the model is provided by the generalized impulse responses and the generalized forecast error variance decompositions. Those measures share the important feature of being independent of the ordering of the variables, which makes for a substantial improvement over the traditional counterparts of these measures. The analysis of both sets of generalized measures seems to suggest that firms use short-term credit as a liquidity buffer which could be interpreted as additional indirect evidence in favour of the customer view of credit markets. More direct evidence for the customer view, comes from the "persistence profiles", which exhibit a very slow adjustment to equilibrium in the credit market (Table 10) .
Thus our empirical analysis adduces considerable support for Okun's original conception of the functioning of credit markets. This analysis needs to be supplemented by survey studies of Indian banks and firms. Admittedly, such surveys are difficult to execute but they can throw considerable insight into the actual mechanisms underlying the customer relationships. Additionally, surveys can throw up useful disaggregative information by disaggregating across borrower categories (e.g. small firms, households, large firms etc.) as well as loan types (short-term and long-term).
The aggregative nature of econometric studies and degrees of freedom constraints imposed on econometric models are well-known limitations and our model is no exception. Nevertheless, as a starting point, it can lay claim to some merit for opening up an issue largely neglected in the context of LDC credit markets. Notes : (i) The tests are for the specification 2 (restricted intercepts, no trends)
TABLES
(ii) (*) denotes significance at 5% level. 
Note: (i) All the interest elasticities are at the mean. Notes: (i) (*) and (**) denote significance at 5% and 1% levels respectively.
(ii) figures in brackets are t-values. --" --Negligible --" --
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